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SHOULD CLERGY HOLD THE PRIEST-
PENITENT PRIVILEGE?
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 1996, the Reverend Timothy Mockaitis, a Catholic
priest of the archdiocese of Portland, Oregon, reported to jail.' Conan
Hale, a suspect in a brutal triple homicide, had requested the presence
of a Catholic priest so he could make a confession, and Father
Mockaitis complied.2
Unbeknownst to Fr. Mockaitis, however, the officials at the Lane
County Adult Corrections Facility were recording his conversation with
Mr. Hale, and forwarded the tape to the office of the Lane County Dis-
trict Attorney, Doug Harcleroad. Two deputy district attorneys lis-
tened to it, and the tape was transcribed.3
It soon became known to the press and the public that Hale's con-
fession had been recorded, 4 and the reaction was swift.' Portland arch-
diocesan officials immediately petitioned to have the tape destroyed
and attempted to secure a guarantee that prison officials would not rec-
ord any further sacramental confessions.6 After the state trial court de-
nied its motion, the archdiocese filed a civil rights claim in federal court.
After a district court refused to exercise jurisdiction over the case,
archdiocesan officials appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, alleging, among other things, that Fr. Mockaitis's
constitutional rights had been violated.7
A three-judge panel agreed. The court held that the state had vio-
lated Fr. Mockaitis's reasonable expectation of privacy in his communi-
cations with Mr. Hale, given the recognition under Oregon law for the
"member of clergy-penitent privilege" and the "uniform respect" for
the "[inviolable] character of sacramental confession" shown through-
1. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1524 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. See id at 1525.
3. See id
4. See id at 1526.
5. See Lori Lee Brocker, Sacred Secrets: The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Finds Its Way
into the News, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15 (Oct. 1996).
6. See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1526.
7. See id
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out the "history of the nation."8 The court also relied on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)9 in concluding that Oregon had
violated Fr. Mockaitis's right to the free exercise of his religion."
This Comment seeks to answer some of the many questions raised
by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mockaitis." May a member of the
clergy claim the priest-penitent privilege 2 on his or her own behalf? In
8. Id. at 1531-32.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
10. See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1528-31.
11. An interesting question posed by the Mockaitis case lies outside the scope of this
Comment, but deserves a brief mention nonetheless because of the issues it raises: Did Mr.
Hale's confession qualify, under canon law, as a bona fide confession in the first place? In
other words, might there have been no legally actionable question of confidentiality from the
beginning?
Judge Noonan, author of the Ninth Circuit panel's opinion in Mockaitis, claims that "in
Catholic belief all baptized persons are eligible to participate in the Sacrament of Penance."
Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1525. The Code of Canon Law, which governs Catholic sacramental
practice, does not contain any phrase nearly as expansive as Judge Noonan's. The pertinent
canon, 844, §4, states that Catholic ministers may licitly administer the sacrament of penance
to Christians who are neither Catholic nor Eastern Orthodox "who do not have full com-
munion with the Catholic Church" provided they (1) are in danger of death or have some
other grave need for the sacrament, (2) cannot approach a minister of their own community,
(3) ask for the sacrament on their own, (4) manifest "Catholic faith" in the sacrament, and
(5) are "properly disposed." THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 609-
11 (James A. Coriden et al. eds., 1985).
Noonan states that Hale was "a baptized Christian," but not Catholic. 104 F.3d at 1525.
Why, then, did Hale ask for a Catholic priest to go to confession if he was not Catholic? The
answer to this question may be more apparent if one believes Jeffrey James Carley, a detec-
tive in the Lane County sheriff's office, who swore in a search warrant affidavit that Hale
knew his conversations with visitors were being recorded. See id- Given the self-exculpatory
nature of Hale's "confession" to Fr. Mockaitis and his subsequent willingness to have the
taped confession given to his defense attorneys, see id. at 1527, it is certainly possible to con-
clude that Hale was simply using the sacrament for his own purposes.
According to one commentator, the sacramental seal of the confessional does not exist if
a person "approaches the priest with the intention of deceiving him or of making fun of the
sacrament." WILLIAM H. WOESTMAN, O.M.I., SACRAMENTS: INITIATION, PENANCE,
ANOINTING OF THE SICK 265 (1992). If this is true, Fr. Mockaitis might not have owed Mr.
Hale any obligation of confidentiality to begin with.
12. Scholars differ on the precise title of this privilege. See 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5612,
27-28 (1992). Professors Wright and Graham note that the traditional title of "priest-
penitent" is not completely accurate, as the privilege is no longer limited to priests and be-
cause the communication itself does not have to be of a strictly penitential nature for it to be
privileged. See id.
Wright and Graham contend the term "clergy" as a replacement for "priest" is not "par-
ticularly euphonious," id. at 28, and propose to replace the traditional title with "the peni-
tent's privilege." Id at 29. That phrase, however, seems problematic for two reasons. First,
it still does not acknowledge that modern courts recognize non-penitential communications
made to members of the clergy. Second, the phrase begs the question this Comment seeks to
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light of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores,13
which struck down RFRA in part, if not entirely,14 does the Free Exer-
cise Clause protect a member of the clergy from being required to re-
veal the contents of a confidential communication? 5 Does the Estab-
lishment Clause pose any problems for an expansive view of the
privilege?
As a backdrop for answering these questions, Part II of this Com-
ment sketches the basic outline of the evolution of the priest-penitent
privilege in the United States and its current status in state and federal
courts. 16 Part III then discusses the right of a member of the clergy to
assert the privilege under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and answers the Establishment Clause objection to this
interpretation of the privilege. The conclusion contains a proposal ar-
guing for the privilege's expansion.
II. EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE PRIEST-PENITENT
PRIVILEGE
The Federal Rules of Evidence direct federal courts to begin with
the common law when determining whether to recognize a privilege.17
answer: Who holds the privilege? Because a more precise appellation has not yet gained
widespread acceptance, this Comment refers to the privilege by its traditional title.
13. 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170-71 (1997) (holding RFRA was too broad in scope and that it
exceeded Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See infra note 145.
15. The arena in which members of the clergy are subject to compelled testimony is
larger than courtrooms, especially in light of the advent of mandatory reporting laws con-
cerning various forms of abuse. This Comment concerns the rights of clergy in all testimonial
situations. For a further treatment of mandatory reporting laws and the rights of clergy, see
Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the
Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1987). See also Jill D.
Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries
and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063 (1995).
16. For a more comprehensive treatment of the history of the privilege, see generally
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, at § 5612; JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD
TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE
LAWv 33-90 (3d ed. 1989); Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-
Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95,96-108 (1983).
17. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness [or] person ... shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:171
Thus, it is important to identify the extent to which the common law
recognized the priest-penitent privilege. And because much of the
common law regarding this privilege grew out of the canon law of the
Catholic Church,"8 the analysis must begin there.
A. The Privilege's Origins in Canon Law
The practice of confession has had a long tradition in Christian
thought and practice, dating back to the New Testament 9 and the early
Christian communitiesY2 The first explicit papal order aimed at viola-
tors of the seal of the confessional appeared at the end of the ninth cen-
tury,2 ' and a formal canon promulgated after the Fourth Lateran Coun-
cil in 1215 imposed a strict obligation of secrecy on the entire Church:
Let the priest absolutely beware that he does not by word or sign
or by any manner whatever in any way betray the sinner: but if
he should happen to need wiser counsel let him cautiously seek
the same without any mention of person. For whoever shall dare
to reveal a sin disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance we de-
cree that he shall be not only deposed from the priestly office,
but that he shall also be sent into the confinement of a monas-
tery to do perpetual penance. 22
18. See Yellin, supra note 16, at 97; Mitchell, supra note 15, at 735.
19. See Acts 19:18-19: "Many of those who had become believers came forward and
openly acknowledged their former practices. Moreover, a large number of those who had
practiced magic collected their books and burned them in public. They calculated their value
and found it to be fifty thousand silver pieces." See also James 5:16: "Therefore, confess
your sins to one another and pray for one another, that you may be healed. The fervent
prayer of a righteous person is very powerful."
20. Theodore of Mopsuestia, a fifth century theologian, acknowledged the confidential
nature of confessional communications this way:
It behooves us, therefore, to draw near to the priests in great confidence and to re-
veal to them our sins; and those priests, with all diligence, solicitude, and love, and
in accord with the regulations.., will grant healing to sinners. [The priests] will not
disclose the things that ought not be disclosed; rather, they will be silent about the
things that have happened, as befits true and loving fathers who are bound to guard
the shame of their children while striving to heal their bodies.
2 WILLIAM A. JURGENS, THE FAITH OF THE EARLY FATHERS 83-84 (1979). In letters to
bishops, Pope St. Leo I, bishop of Rome from 440 to 461, both recommended the practice of
private confession and ordered confessors to stop revealing penitents' sins publicly. See 3
WILLIAM A. JURGENS, THE FAITH OF THE EARLY FATHERS 272-73 (1979).
21. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 44 (noting that priests who violated the
seal were to be removed from office and sent into lifelong exile).
22. R.S. Nolan, The Law of the Seal of Confession, in 13 THE CATHOLIC
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The prohibition against breaking the seal of the confessional has
persisted throughout the centuries. The current Code of Canon Law of
the Catholic Church still obliges those who come to know of penitential
communications to keep them confidential:
The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a
confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other
manner or for any reason. An interpreter, if there is one pres-
ent, is also obliged to preserve the secret, and also all others to
whom knowledge of sins from confession shall come in any
way.
23
Canon Law also forbids church authorities from using knowledge of
sins obtained in the confession for the external governance of the
church. '4 The penalty for any direct violation of the seal of the confes-
sional is automatic excommunication.2
This long tradition of the confidentiality of penitential communica-
tions, evident in canon law and the practice of various faith communi-
ties, shows not only the foundation on which the common law based its
approval of the privilege, but provides a strong basis for an argument
that at least certain members of the clergy have a well-founded belief in
their obligation to keep certain communications secret.26
B. The Privilege at Common Law
1. In England
How deep are the roots of this privilege in the common law of Eng-
land? Scholars disagree. Some claim authoritatively, generally relying
on Wigmore, that the priest-penitent privilege either did not exist at all
under the common law, or that it disappeared after the Protestant Ref-
ormation. Others, however, are less emphatic about the privilege's
ENCYCLOPEDIA 649 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1912).
23. 1983 CODE c.983, §§ 1, 2.
24. See 1983 CODE c.984, §§ 1, 2.
25. See 1983 CODE c.1388 §§ 1, 2.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 15, at 736 ("[T]he law [after the Reformation] ceased
to recognize the clergy privilege."); Yellin, supra note 16, at 101 ("[W]hile the privilege may
have existed in the common law of England before the Reformation, the virtually unanimous
opinion is that the privilege ceased to exist after the Reformation."); Ronald J. Colombo,
Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L.
1998]
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non-existence and highlight the subtleties in Wigmore's argument.
Those holding that the privilege was recognized at common law
point to its ancient origins in Anglo-Saxon law. They cite decrees of
certain Anglo-Saxon rulers showing respect for the practice of confes-
sion, and infer that the secrecy surrounding the sacrament would also
have been respected, given the close connection between the laws of the
Catholic Church and the laws governing Anglo-Saxons.' They further
argue that although the Battle of Hastings may have changed the face of
England, it did not disturb the privilege, and to that effect, they quote a
law of Henry I, son of William the Conqueror and king of England from
1100-1135: "Priests should guard that they not reveal to acquaintances
or strangers what has been confessed to them by those who come for
confession; for if they do it, even in good faith, they will be sentenced to
live all the days of their life as an honorless pilgrim." 3°
Although further documentary evidence of the privilege's existence
before the sixteenth century is limited and ambiguous,31 a circumstantial
argument is perhaps more persuasive. Given the congruence between
the laws of the land and the laws of the Church in a Christian country
such as England, it is highly unlikely that Christian judges and lawyers
would either compel a priest to break the seal of the confessional or
make use of any confidential communication, as the judges and lawyers
REV. 225, 230 (1998) ("This privilege lost its recognition following the Protestant Reforma-
tion in England."); Chad Homer, Note, Beyond the Confines of the Confessiona" The Priest-
Penitent Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 701 (1997) ("At common law,
English law did not recognize the privilege...."); John J. Montone, III, Comment, In Search
of Forgiveness: State v. Szemple and the Priest-Penitent Privilege in New Jersey, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 263, 268 (1995) ("Scholars... are certain that common law courts did not recognize
a privilege for clergymen following the rise of the Anglican Church."); Julie Ann Sippel,
Comment, Priest-Penitent Privilege Statutes: Dual Protection in the Confessional, 43 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1994) ("[T]he priest-penitent privilege was not recognized at com-
mon law .... ).
28. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 29 n.28 ("The authority
cited in support of this proposition [that there was no penitent's privilege at common law] is
seldom impressive .... ); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 5.38, at 632 (1995) ("While there was skepticism as
to the existence of this privilege in some early English cases, it seems that this skepticism was
a function of religious contentiousness of the post-Reformation era rather than a real indica-
tion of the eclipse of the privilege.") (citations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 22, at 649; BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 47-48.
But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 36 (noting that "none of the quoted
laws deals with the seal of the confessional, much less the privilege").
30. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 48-49 (citation omitted). But see WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 36 (asking whether the king considered himself to be an
"acquaintance" or "stranger").
31. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 37-39.
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were subject to the same ecclesiastical penalties.'
What happened to the privilege after the Reformation? Wigmore
claims that although English courts continued to recognize the privilege
even after King Henry VIII's break with Rome in 1531, the privilege
ceased to exist after the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, and he
uses a dozen cases to support his conclusion?3 Wright and Graham find
his efforts unconvincing, and point to the weak foundation these twelve
cases provide.
Wright and Graham suggest that at least four of Wigmore's twelve
"cases," and possibly as many as seven, are nothing more than dicta. 5
They also indicate that two of Wigmore's cases are from trial courts,
and that the precedential value of another case was completely rejected
in the nineteenth century by a respected English evidence scholar.36
Wright and Graham also assert that one of Wigmore's two "decisive
rulings," Normanshaw v. Normanshaw,37 appears much too late (1893)
to have influenced the common law in the United States, and long after
commentators were claiming no privilege existed.38 The final case in-
volves a court in Ireland in 1802 deciding the property rights of an Irish
Catholic. This is, Wright and Graham comment, "a bit like using cur-
rent practices in Northern Ireland as evidence of the English law of civil
rights," and is hardly a reliable footing on which to ground an absolute
claim that the priest-penitent privilege did not exist at English common
law.
39
In light of this historical controversy, perhaps the most accurate
conclusion one can draw is that whether the privilege existed under
English common law "has never been solemnly decided."4 And while
there is still no statutory recognition of the privilege in England,4' other
European countries have for many years formally recognized it.42
32. See id. at 36.
33. "But since the Restoration, and for more than two centuries of English practice, the
almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least two decisive rulings) has
denied the existence of [the priest-penitent] privilege." 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2394, at 869 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
34. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 3941.
35. See id. at 39 n.98.
36. See icL at 40.
37. 69 L.T.R. 468 (P.D. & A. 1893), quoted in Yellin, supra note 16, at 103 n.41.
38. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 40 n.105.
39. IdL at 40-41 n.107.
40. l at 41 n.108.
41. See Yellin, supra note 16, at 103.
42. An influential law review article in the 1960s noted the widespread acceptance of
1998]
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2. In the United States
In the United States, very few cases have denied the existence of a
priest-penitent privilege.43 Once again, however, Wigmore is often cited
as the source for an authoritative declaration that the privilege did not
exist at common law in this country.' And once again, a careful reading
of the cases Wigmore cites casts doubt on his claim.
Wigmore asserts that "the privilege cannot be said to have been
recognized as a rule of the common law ... in the United States." 45
Wright and Graham maintain that this is true only in a certain, limited
sense, for "it also 'cannot be said' that the privilege was not recognized"
at common law in the United States.M To support his claim, Wigmore
refers to only three cases, and none of these is dispositive because of
their peculiar fact situations. One case involved a public confession be-
fore members of a congregation, not a private communication to a
cleric.47 A second case involved a statement to a Salvation Army offi-
cer, which the court simply presumed would have been protected had
the privilege existed.4 The third case involved a witness testifying to
what he heard a priest tell a penitent in confession.49 These cases hardly
provide a sufficient foundation on which to base a claim that the privi-
lege was not recognized under the common law of the United States.
Whether federal courts recognize the privilege depends entirely on
common law, as Congress has refrained from providing any statutory
recognition of privileges in general.5° On at least two occasions, the
United States Supreme Court has expressed not only its approval of the
privilege, but has testified to its existence at common law as well.
the privilege on the European continent. See Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to
the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 56-57 (1963). Reese noted that Austria, as one example,
rendered void testimony from "ministers in regard to facts that were communicated to them
either during confession or under the seal of secrecy." Id. at 57 n.9.
43. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 43.
44. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 15, at 737 ("[A] clergy privilege was not part of the
common law imported into this country .. "); Colombo, supra note 27, at 231 ("[T]he com-
mon law that the United States inherited did not include the clergy-penitent privilege.");
Sippel, supra note 27, at 1130 ("[T]he priest-penitent privilege was not recognized at com-
mon law .... ).
45. WIGMORE, supra note 33, at 870-71.
46. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 43 n.123 (emphasis added).
47. See Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161,162 (1818).
48. See State v. Morehous, 117 A. 296, 300 (N.J. 1922), overruled in part by State v.
Smith, 161 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1960).
49. See Bahrey v. Poniatishin, 112 A. 481,481 (N.J. 1920).
50. See supra note 17.
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In Totten v. United States,51 the Supreme Court held that public pol-
icy precluded the maintenance of any suit which would "lead to the dis-
closure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and re-
specting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated."
' 2
Although Totten dealt with a case involving national secrets, the Court
indicated in dictum that "suits cannot be maintained which would re-
quire a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional... 2 3 This
passage is significant, because it shows the nation's highest court viewed
the privilege favorably as early as 1875, even in the absence of statutory
authority.
The Court again addressed the priest-penitent privilege in United
States v. Nixon,- noting that while communications between presidents
and their staffs may not be privileged, communications with a priest
may be: "[G]enerally, an attorney or a priest may not be required to
disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.""5
As recently as 1980, the Supreme Court again affirmed its support
for the privilege in Trammel v. United States. 6 In its discussion of the
marital privilege, the Court noted in dictum that the other evidentiary
privileges protecting private communications between a "priest and
penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient.., are rooted
in the imperative need for confidence and trust." In particular, "[t]he
priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a
spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed
to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and
guidance in return."58 Now that the Supreme Court has extended a
privilege to confidential communications between psychotherapists (in-
51. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
52. Id at 107.
53. Id
54. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
55. Id at 709. The Court went on to say:
These and other interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced disclo-
sure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at common law. Whatever their
origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
truth.
Id at 709-10.
56. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
57. Id at 51.
58. Id
1998]
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cluding even "licensed social workers") and their patients,59 the recogni-
tion of the more established priest-penitent privilege seems quite se-
cure, at least in the federal courts."'
Some scholars have argued that state courts, on the other hand, have
never had the opportunity to develop fully the privilege under the
common law. Advocates of this position point to several instances in
which a trial court's refusal to recognize the privilege of a member of
the clergy led to quick legislative action.6 Nevertheless, there are cases
that show support for the priest-penitent privilege, even before state
legislatures began to act.
The earliest and most influential of these cases is People v. Phillips.62
In Phillips, Fr. Anthony Kohlmann, pastor of St. Peter's Catholic
Church, had returned some stolen goods to their rightful owner, a Mr.
James Cating. When pressed to identify the person who had given him
the property to return, Fr. Kohlmann refused, citing the seal of the con-
fessional.!
The Court of General Sessions of the City of New York refused to
compel the priest to testify, rooting its decision in the "benevolent and
just principles of the common law," which prevented a witness from
being placed between the "Scylla" of violating his religious oath and
suffering the attached penalties and the "Charybdis" of criminal pun-
ishment.64 The court also based its decision "upon the ground of the
constitution, of the social compact, and of civil and religious liberty."65
Significantly, the court relied not only on the constitution of the state of
New York, but also on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment:
59. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-32 (1996).
60. A number of recent federal decisions have favored the privilege. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d
275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Eckmann v. Board of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo. 1985);
In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433,436 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
61. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 43 n.129; see also Yellin, supra
note 16, at 107-08.
62. The case, though not officially reported, was set forth by one of the attorneys who
participated in the case as amicus curiae and reprinted in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (1813). The case was reprinted again in Privileged
Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955) [hereinafter Privileged Communi-
cations].
63. See Privileged Communications, supra note 62, at 200.
64. Id. at 201-02.
65. Id. at 206.
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It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances
should be administered-that its ceremonies as well as its essen-
tials should be protected. The sacraments of a religion are its
most important elements. We have but two in the Protestant
Church-Baptism and the Lord's Supper-and they are consid-
ered the seals of the covenant of grace. Suppose that a decision
of this court, or a law of the state should prevent the administra-
tion of one or both of these sacraments, would not the constitu-
tion be violated, and the freedom of religion be infringed?
Every man who hears me will answer in the affirmative. Will not
the same result follow, if we deprive the Roman catholic [sic] of
one of his ordinances? Secrecy is of the essence of penance. The
sinner will not confess, nor will the priest receive his confession,
if the veil of secrecy is removed: To decide that the minister
shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare
that there shall be no penance; and this important branch of the
Roman catholic [sic] religion would be thus annihilated.66
Another New York court relied on Phillips in another case just four
years later. In People v. Smith,67 a Protestant minister was asked to re-
veal the communication made to him by a murder suspect. The court
distinguished Phillips on the grounds that the defendant had ap-
proached the minister as a "friend or adviser" and not in his capacity as
a professional, and that the minister voiced no objection to testifying."
C. Statutory Expansion of the Privilege
Soon after these decisions, the New York legislature enacted the
first statute of its kind in the United.States." Some have argued that the
New York legislature intended to extend the privilege to non-Catholic
ministers after the Smith ruling limited the privilege to Catholic
priests.7" A close reading of the holding in Smith, however, indicates
that the judge in that case appears simply to have limited the privilege
in the same manner as the legislature did, in holding that (1) the corn-
66. Id. at 207.
67. 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817), reprinted in Privileged Communica-
tions, supra note 62, at 209-13.
68. Privileged Communications, supra note 62, at 211.
69. The 1828 statute reads as follows: "No minister of the gospel, or priest of any de-
nomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confession made to him in his pro-
fessional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such de-
nomination." (quoted in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 46-47 n.152).
70. See, e.g., Yellin, supra note 16, at 106.
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munication must have been both professional in nature and compelled
by religious obligation, and (2) the communication did not simply arise
within the bonds of friendship."
In any case, other states began to follow the example of the New
York legislature.7 2 By 1904, twenty-five states had enacted a statutory
privilege.73 By 1963, forty-four states had the privilege. 4 Today, all fifty
states have enacted statutes recognizing the privilege.*'
The scope of these statutes varies considerably,7 6 and a detailed
71. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 47.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Yellin, supra note 16, at 108.
75. See ALA. R. EVID. 505; ALASKA R. EVID. 506; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062
(West 1989); ARK. R. EVID. 505; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 1991);
DEL. R. EVID. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22
(1995); HAW. R. EVID. 506; IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-803 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1994); KY. R. EVID. 505; LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); ME. R. EvID. 505; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111
(1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
22 (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804
(1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 1996);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1998);
N.M. R. EVID. 11-506; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1996);
N.D. R. EVID. 505; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5943 (West 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90
(Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-16 to 19-13-18 (Michie 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (Supp. 1997); TEX. R. EVID. 505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3)
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp.
1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9
(1997); WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (1995-96); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
76. The text of the proposed federal rule on the priest-penitent privilege reads as fol-
lows:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a re-
ligious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person
consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not intended for fur-
ther disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a
clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by
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study of them is beyond the scope of this Comment.' Thus, the exami-
nation that follows will focus solely on how the various states treat the
holder of the privilege: namely, (1) Who qualifies as a "member of the
clergy?" and (2) Who holds the privilege?
1. Who Qualifies as a "Member of the Clergy?"
While some statutes list by title those clergy included in the privi-
lege,' others are less specific. 9 Legislatures have generally left to the
courts the difficult task of applying their general definitions to specific
situations.' One possible justification for vagueness in many statutes is
his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The
clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His authority so to do is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Reprinted in MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 506 (4th ed.
1996). This rule, though ultimately rejected by Congress, was used as a model by a number
of states. See infra note 110.
77. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, §§ 5615-19, for a detailed treatment of the
elements of the privilege not covered here (e.g., what is a "confidential" communication?
what types of "communications" are covered?). See also Yellin, supra note 16, at 114-37.
78. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995) (extending privilege to Protestant minis-
ters, Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox priests, Jewish rabbis, and Christian or Jewish
ministers "by whatever name called"); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978) (defining a "mem-
ber of the clergy" as "a clergyman or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Chris-
tian Science practitioner"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (Supp. 1997) (providing that "no
minister of the gospel, no priest of the Catholic Church, no rector of the Episcopal Church,
no ordained rabbi, and no regular minister of religion of any religious organization or de-
nomination usually referred to as a church" be allowed or required to testify under certain
conditions, and imposing even criminal penalties on violators of this ban); WIS. STAT. §
905.06(1)(a) (1995-96) (defining a "member of the clergy" as "a minister, priest, rabbi, or
other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so
to be by the person consulting the individual.").
79. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (West 1989) (extending the privilege to
a "clergyman or priest"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 1998) (ex-
tending the privilege to a "member of the clergy or a priest").
80. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23,27-28 (Mont. 1998); State v. Szemple, 622
A.2d 248,254 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), affd 640 A.2d 817 (NJ. 1994); State v. Buss,
887 P.2d 920, 923 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 951-52 (Utah
1994); Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917). In Reutkemeier, the court asked:
What is a "minister of the Gospel" within the meaning of this statute? The law as
such sets up no standard or criterion. That question is left wholly to the recognition
of the "denomination." The word "minister," which in its original sense meant a
mere servant, has grown in many directions and into much dignity. Few English
words have a more varied meaning. In the religious world it is often, if not gener-
ally, used as referring to a pastor of the church and a preacher of the Gospel. This
meaning, however, is not applicable to all Christian denominations. Some of them
have no pastors and recognize no one as a minister in that sense, and yet all de-
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that a more specific list of "acceptable" members of the clergy might
trigger a constitutional attack on the basis of religious discrimination or
perhaps even as a violation of the Establishment Clause."
Most statutes imply that a member of the clergy must be connected
in some way with a religious organization. While certain titles suggest
such a link,' some statutes require more. One state demands the mem-
ber of the clergy be "settled in the work of the ministry,"s' and that he
or she be "accredited by""5 a church body before the privilege can be in-
voked. Other states hold the clergy member must be "accountable to
the authority of"86 a church body, which some states go on to say must
have certain characteristics,"' be "legally cognizable,"" or be part of an
"organized" religion."
Faced with these thorny dilemmas, courts often simply concede that
a person is a minister of a church, and will instead focus on whether the
minister's church requires the communication to be kept confidential.'
A New Jersey court ruled, for example, that a communication to a
Catholic nun fell outside the statute, and held her in contempt of court
for refusing to testify.9' The court based its conclusion on two grounds:
(1) its own interpretation of Catholic doctrine and practice concerning
nominations recognize the spiritual authority of the church and provide a source of
spiritual advice and discipline.
Id. at 292.
81. See Yellin, supra note 16, at 120; see also MacKinnon, 957 P.2d at 28 (adopting a
broad reading of the privilege so as "to minimize the risk that [the statute] might be dis-
criminatorily applied because of differing judicial perceptions of a given church's practices or
religious doctrine").
82. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 743-44.
83. "Priest" with Catholicism and "rabbi" with Judaism, for instance.
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 1991).
85. Id.
86. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1998).
87. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1994) ("established on the basis of a commu-
nity of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character"); see also Foundation
of Human Understanding v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1341, 1358 (1987) (listing fourteen crite-
ria the Internal Revenue Service uses when determining whether an organization is a
church).
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1998).
89. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4) (West 1996). See also Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d
779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to recognize a psychic under the state's privilege stat-
ute).
90. See Yellin, supra note 16, at 117; see also State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 27
(Mont. 1998). But see State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 1990) (distinguishing
between ordained and non-ordained ministers).
91. See In re Murtha, 279 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
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the nun's activities, and (2) the legislative history surrounding the ex-
pansion of the privilege in New Jersey.9
Other courts, however, have allowed for a greater expansion of the
privilege.93 In Eckmann v. Board of Education,94 for example, a federal
district court held communications to a nun were privileged because she
had been acting in her capacity as a spiritual advisor.95 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that a nun could qualify as a "clergyman" un-
der the state's privilege statute.96 And a New York court recently ac-
knowledged that a priest-penitent privilege might exist between a Mus-
lim and an advisor of the Muslim faith under certain circumstances.' In
the wake of changes in the religious experience of the American people,
from a decline in priestly vocations to the influence of non-Western re-
ligions, courts will likely address this question of what qualifies some-
one to be a member of the clergy with even greater frequency.98
2. Who Holds the Privilege?
The holder of an evidentiary privilege has the power to invoke or
waive it, either refusing or allowing courts to gain access to confidential
communications.99 Clients, not their attorneys, control the decision to
reveal private confidences made to them in the course of the attorney-
client relationship."O° In many jurisdictions, patients enjoy the right to
act as "holder" of the "doctor-patient" privilege, and may either allow
or prevent medical professionals from testifying to certain statements
made in the course of their treatment.' ' And the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently acknowledged the right of patients to prevent psychothera-
pists and licensed social workers from revealing certain confidential
communications."
92- See id. at 891-93.
93. West Virginia, for example, explicitly provides for nuns in its privilege statute. W.
VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997). See also Sister Simone Campbell, SSS, Catholic Sisters, Irregu-
larly Ordained Women and the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 9 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 540-42
(1976).
94. 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
95. See id. at 72-73.
96. See Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. 1981).
97. See People v. Johnson, 497 N.Y.S.2d 539,539 (App. Div. 1985).
98. See Homer, supra note 27, at 711-12.
99. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 439 (3d ed.
1996).
100. See id. at 452.
101. See id. at 480.
102. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923,1931-32 (1996).
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These commonly accepted evidentiary privileges, although similar to
the priest-penitent privilege, can be distinguished from it in at least
three significant ways. First, the foundations of the priest-penitent
privilege are uniquely religious in nature, resting historically on the
canon law of the Catholic Church. °3 Second, the priest-penitent privi-
lege has generally been considered absolute, prohibiting any revelation
of the protected communication, unlike the other evidentiary privileges
with their numerous exceptions."4 Finally, and most importantly for
this discussion, the priest-penitent privilege often directly affects a re-
ligious obligation of the one receiving the communication, as opposed
to the merely civic duties of lawyers and doctors. Important as the civic
duties of client loyalty and patient confidentiality might be, and as sig-
nificant as the social goods that result from such policies, the obligations
of secrecy upon lawyers and doctors do not carry the same weight-nor,
arguably, merit the same degree of constitutional protection-as the sa-
cred obligations that fall upon members of the clergy.'l5
In this sense, the priest-penitent privilege is more like the spousal
privilege, which has also enjoyed widespread recognition in the courts
under both common law and modem statutes."" Many courts have al-
lowed either spouse to exercise or waive the privilege, due at least in
part to the recognition that one of the purposes of the spousal privilege
is to prevent court-sponsored damage to the socially useful, private, and
even sacred relationships between husbands and wives.'O' If it became
known throughout society that only one spouse could reveal marital
communications, the unfavorable effects on marriage in general could
be substantial. Similarly, the priest-penitent privilege, at least in part,
aims to prevent courts from inflicting harm on the socially useful, pri-
vate, and sacred relationships between members of the clergy and those
who come to them for advice, counsel, and support. Thus, to prevent
harm to these relationships and out of respect for the intimate nature of
these communications, members of the clergy should be allowed to ex-
ercise the privilege on their own behalf.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
104. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12 § 5612, at 71.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
106. See LILLY, supra note 99, at 440.
107. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 980 (West 1995); Martin v. State, 33 So. 2d 825, 827
(Miss. 1948) (Griffith, J., concurring); People v. Sullivan, 249 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (Sup. Ct.
1964). But see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 33, § 2340(1), at 670 (holding that because the privi-
lege was designed to foster marital communication, only the communicating spouse needs to
hold the privilege).
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As yet, however, the identity of the holder of the priest-penitent
privilege is far from settled.'03 State statutes recognizing the priest-
penitent privilege differ in the manner in which they recognize the
holder of the privilege, and there are a number of different ways of or-
ganizing a complete summary of them."° This Comment organizes the
statutes into three groups: (1) those that clearly state the penitent holds
the privilege, (2) those that clearly state both the penitent and the
member of the clergy hold the privilege, and (3) those that do not
clearly state who holds the privilege.
In seventeen states, the penitent's right to hold the privilege is
clearly stated in the statute itself."' These statutes, usually following the
language of the proposed federal rule on the priest-penitent privilege,
generally permit members of the clergy to exercise the privilege in a
limited sense, in that the clergy can assert the privilege "on behalf of" a
penitent."' A handful of jurisdictions explicitly add a restrictive phrase:
a member of the clergy may exercise the privilege, "but only on behalf
of" a penitent.
12
In six states,' both a penitent and a member of the clergy are ex-
pressly allowed by the statute to hold the privilege. Alabama has long
108. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 143-47, 196-98; ScoTr N. STONE &
RONALD S. LIEBMANN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6.08 (1983); Mitchell, supra note 15, at
755; Reese, supra note 42, at 78-79; Yellin, supra note 16, at 137-38; see also Colombo, supra
note 27, at 249-51 (arguing for dual ownership of the privilege). This Comment does not ex-
plore whether the clergy have a right to unilaterally waive the privilege.
109. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755-60; Montone, supra note 27, at 283-85; Sip-
pel, supra note 27, at 1134-36.
110. See ALASKA R. EVID. 506; ARK. R. EVID. 505; DEL. R. EVID. 505; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.505 (West Supp. 1998); HAW. R. EvID. 506; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1994);
KY. R. EVID. 505; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); ME. R. EvID. 505; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506;
N.D. R. EVID. 505; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
19-13-18 (Michie 1995); TEX. R. EVID. 505; WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (1995-96).
111. ALASKA R. EVID. 506; DEL. R. EvID. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West Supp.
1998); HAW. R. EVID. 506; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1994); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art.
511 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506
(1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506; WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (1995-96).
112. ARK. R. EVID. 505; KY. R. EVID. 505; ME. R. EVID. 505; N.D. R. EVID. 505;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-18 (Michie
1995); TEX. R. EVID. 505 (emphasis added).
113. Delaware might be considered as a seventh state with a statute explicitly allowing
members of the clergy to exercise a privilege on their own behalf. While the privilege stat-
ute, DEL. R. EVID. 505, merely allows clergy to exercise the privilege "on behalf of" a peni-
tent, see supra note 110, another statute excuses a priest who learns of suspected child abuse
from a "sacramental confession" from the duty to report it. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909
(Supp. 1997).
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recognized the right of both parties to hold the privilege. 14 California
has two statutes; one allowing for the "penitent" to exercise the privi-
lege, and one allowing the "clergyman" to exercise it."5 Colorado re-
cently (in 1988) expanded its privilege statute to allow members of the
clergy to exercise the privilege."6 New Jersey, in the wake of a 1994 de-
cision by its state supreme court ruling that only the clergy held the
privilege,17 recently expanded its statutory provision to include the
penitent."8  Ohio's general prohibition of testimony from clergy re-
garding confidential matters is lifted when the penitent expressly con-
sents to disclosure, "except when the disclosure of the information is in
violation of the clergyman's, rabbi's, priest's, or minister's sacred
trust."".9  Pennsylvania's statute expressly protects members of the
clergy from being compelled to testify about certain confidential com-
munications.2 And although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet
to definitively construe its language, the Pennsylvania statute is similar
to a New Jersey rule of evidence that was recently scrutinized by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.'2' In State v. Szemple,'22 the court held the
statute conferred the right to hold the privilege on the clergyman
alone."
In the remaining twenty-seven states,24 the privilege statute does not
114. See ALA. R. EVID. 505.
115. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1995) (penitent), § 1034 (West 1995)
(clergy), with CAL. EVID. CODE § 993 (West 1995) (only patient or his or her representative
may hold the physician-patient privilege).
116. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (West 1997).
117. See State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1994).
118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1998).
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1998).
120. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 1982). The modifying phrase "without
consent of such person," because of the surrounding punctuation, appears to apply only to
the words "or allowed." Il
121. For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis of this rule of evi-
dence, see generally Montone, supra note 27.
122. 640 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1994).
123. See id. at 825.
124. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146b (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1997);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 1998);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111
(1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
491.060(4) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49.255 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol.
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-
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clearly indicate who holds the privilege. While the identity of the
holder may sometimes be inferred, with varying degrees of difficulty,
from other language in the statute, not all states have had their judici-
aries construe the statutory language. Thus, some confusion still ex-
i~S125ists. Iz
One writer described four distinct categories into which these privi-
lege statutes could fall.12 The first consists of statutes that declare
clergy may not testify as to confidential communicationsV Statutes like
these seem to be more rules of witness competency than rules of privi-
lege, and seemingly do not allow anyone to waive them."2 A second
category of statutes includes those that state a member of the clergy
may not disclose without the penitent's consent,"' apparently bestowing
the penitent alone with the power to invoke or waive the privilege."5
Statutes in the third category indicate clergy shall not be compelled to
testify,1 31 implying that members of the clergy alone hold the privilege."
206 (Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3)(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607
(1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-
101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
125. See generally Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755-60.
126. See id. at 755 n.181.
127. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 1998);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4) (West
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie
1997).
128. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755 n.181.
129. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146b (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West
Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c)
(West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255
(Michie 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1996); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-
8(3) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 1998). But see Ryan v.
Ryan, 642 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Mass. 1994) (holding, inter alia, that "priest-penitent" privi-
lege, unlike most other evidentiary privileges, is "absolute").
130. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755 n.181.
131. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CrS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1997).
132. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755 n.181; see also Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins
Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413,415 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the "plain meaning of the
[Virginia] statute grants the privilege only to the minister, priest or rabbi, not to the penitent
or lay communicant"). The court acknowledged that "most penitent-priest" statutes in other
jurisdictions require the consent of the penitent for disclosure, but insisted that Virginia's
statute was different, id. at 416, and that it is up to the priest's "conscience to decide when
disclosure is appropriate." Id. But see People v. Burnidge, 664 N.E.2d 656, 659 (11. App. Ct.
1996) (holding the privilege belonged both to the penitent and the member of the clergy).
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The fourth category of statutes includes those that say members of the
clergy shall not be compelled to testify without the penitent's consent,'33
implying that both parties must object to disclosure before the privilege
applies.
Despite these variances among the state laws, a federal district court
in 1985 summarily claimed, in Eckmann v. Board of Education,35 that
most states vested this privilege with the cleric. The court went on to
hold that members of the clergy were the proper holders of the privilege
under federal common law, though it acknowledged that other federal
courts had not yet arrived at the same conclusion.'36 Although this
claim would be difficult to sustain given the subtleties in the statutes as
noted above, this decision suggests an important development in the
recognition at the federal level of this privilege.'
But even in the absence of a law clearly recognizing the clergy as a
holder of the privilege, very few courts throughout U.S. history have
compelled clerics to reveal confidential statements made to them in
their capacity as ministers. "8 Judges and lawyers are often reluctant to
turn clerics into informers, let alone martyrs.'39 Some have argued this
reluctance on the part of judicial officers to appear hostile is one reason
why the right of clerics to refrain from testifying is so seldom challenged
in practice. Thus, one noted pair of commentators on the subject rec-
ommends members of the clergy refuse to testify even when grounds for
133. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-
op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997).
134. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 755 n.181. But see New Hampshire v. Melvin, 564
A.2d 458 (N.H. 1989) (holding that the defendant waived the right to invoke the privilege
because he made the statements in the presence of the minister's wife); Vermilye v. State,
754 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that the privilege protects the penitent,
not the minister).
135. 106 F.R.D. 70,73 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
136. See id
137. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 760.
138. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 51; see also State v. Mother-
well, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990) (reversing a conviction of an ordained minister while up-
holding convictions of two non-ordained "religious counselors" for violating a child abuse
reporting statute).
139. For examples of the negative backlash that can accompany efforts to compel mem-
bers of the clergy to testify, see WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PASTOR 24-29 (1964). The life of the 14th century
priest and martyr St. John Nepomucen illustrates how far one government was willing to go
to gain access to a confession, and the resolve of a Catholic priest to never break the seal.
After John refused to divulge the contents of the Queen's confession, King Wenceslaus IV
ordered the priest to be tortured, murdered, and thrown into the Moldau River at Prague.
See JOHN J. DELANEY, DICTIONARY OF SAINTS 324 (1980).
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the privilege are not immediately apparent and the duty of confidenti-
ality far from certain."
Nevertheless, in the wake of emotionally charged cases involving
child abuse or sexual violence, there is often intense pressure to require
testimony from all available parties, even if that means forcing mem-
bers of the clergy to reveal confidential communications.141 Thus, to the
extent these communications will be protected by law, arguments sup-
porting the right of a member of the clergy to refuse to testify need to
be articulated.
III. RIGHT OF MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY TO HOLD THE PRIVILEGE
In Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,2 a Ninth Circuit panel relied in part on
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in ruling that the
rights of a Catholic priest to keep the secrecy of the confessional had
been violated. 43 Two recent law review articles on the privilege also re-
lied heavily on RFRA in arguing that members of the clergy have a free
exercise right to hold the privilege."
In June of 1997, however, the United States Supreme Court struck
down RFRA'4 5 on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's enforcement
powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Thus, a
reevaluation of the constitutionality of the priest-penitent privilege is
necessary.
Some have argued that the "right to privacy" found emanating from
the penumbras of the Constitution in Griswold v. Connecticut47 pro-
vides a constitutional basis for protecting certain confidential communi-
cations.'" One scholar notes that on the relatively few occasions this
140. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 205-09.
141. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kane, 445 N.E.2d 598 (Mass. 1983) (upholding convic-
tion and fining of priest for refusing to divulge the contents of a confidential communication
when the defendant-penitent in a child abuse case waived the privilege); In re Williams, 152
S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 1967), cerL denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967) (holding Baptist minister in con-
tempt of court for refusing to testify against a defendant accused of rape).
142. 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
144. See Montone, supra note 27, at 282; Sippel, supra note 27, at 1151-52.
145. While it is generally understood that RFRA has been struck down insofar as it ap-
plies to the states, whether RFRA still applies to the federal government is still an open
question. At least two bankruptcy courts have held that it does. See, e.g., Christian v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998); In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1997).
146. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2170-71 (1997).
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
148. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
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argument has succeeded, the confidential communications have dealt
with issues of personal autonomy in family matters, not secrecy in gen-
eral.' 49 Thus, an argument that clergy are entitled to the privilege under
the Constitution must stand on firmer ground than that provided by the
right to privacy. That firmer ground is the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.""
A. Clergy's Right to the Privilege Under the U.S. Constitution
The first known case in this country recognizing the priest-penitent
privilege did so on First Amendment grounds.' Since then, however,
no other case seems to have done likewise,52 although scholars have ar-
gued that the Free Exercise Clause should protect members of the
clergy from compelled disclosure of confidential communications.' 5
Arguing that the Free Exercise Clause provides the basis for a member
of the clergy to hold the priest-penitent privilege has never been with-
out its difficulties," but is made even more difficult in light of the
higher threshold set by recent Supreme Court decisions for free exercise
claims.'55 Nevertheless, because the issues are so important and the
burdens placed on claimants so severe, a free exercise argument needs
to be made.
If their right to hold the privilege is not recognized, members of the
clergy could face the burden of having to choose between obeying the
dictates of their conscience or an order of a court. Their right to the
free exercise of their religion in safeguarding communications they hold
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 614-15 (2d ed. 1982); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physi-
cian Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48-49; Jolyan A.
Butler, Note, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege or Right?, 3 CONN. L.
REV. 599 (1971).
149. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 773-74.
150. "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ..
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
152. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at 116. Some courts have avoided tackling
the question. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Ct., 764 P.2d
759, 768 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to rule on clergyman's constitutional right to assert
the privilege because of insufficient evidence in the record of the extent of the clergyman's
duty of non-disclosure under his religion's laws). The Supreme Court of Utah appears to
have come the closest to recognizing a cleric's First Amendment right to assert the priest-
penitent privilege. See Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he constitu-
tional right to the free exercise of religion strongly suggests that the privilege should be rec-
ognized when clergy perform the functions required of them.").
153. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 15, at 793-821.
154. See id. at 795.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 161-78.
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as protected under the laws of their church and sacred in the sight of
God might be seriously obstructed if courts could compel their testi-
mony.56 Further, members of the clergy who are expected by their faith
communities to make themselves available for confidential colloquies
might find it impossible to find work or otherwise exercise their minis-
try if it became known that clergy could be compelled by the govern-
ment to assume the role of informants against members of a congrega-
tion. And as the facts of the Mockaitis case show, the rights of a cleric
are not adequately safeguarded if the penitent alone holds the privi-
lege."5
Whether clergy may assert the privilege is not simply a matter of
concern for an individual penitent and a particular member of the
clergy. Some have argued that the religious freedom of all members of
a religion could be compromised if their clergy could be compelled to
reveal confidential communications.'58 Cardinal Bevilacqua, the Catho-
lic archbishop of Philadelphia, argues that although the good of the
penitent is the "obvious" purpose of sacramental confession, "[t]he
other, more fundamental, purpose of the sacramental seal is the protec-
tion of the Sacrament of Penance itself."'59 Bevilacqua warns:
Were the Sacrament rendered difficult or odious to the faithful
they would be deterred from approaching it, thereby undermin-
ing the Sacrament itself to the great spiritual harm of the faith-
ful, as well as to the entire Church. For this reason, the Church
has always scrupulously protected confessional communications,
treating them as the confidential relations of individuals with
God, mediated through the priest in the Sacrament of Penance'"°
1. The Free Exercise Clause
Before 1990, the United States Supreme Court generally used a
four-step analysis, which had been developed in a string of famous
156. Even Jeremy Bentham, the renowned English jurist who generally opposed any
rule of privilege, made an exception for Catholic priests. See WILLIAM TVINING, THEORIES
OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 99 (1985). He noted that compelling clerics to dis-
close confidential communications would violate one of their "most sacred ... religious du-
ties." 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 588 (1st ed. 1827), quoted
in MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, § 5.38, at 632 n.4.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
158. See, e.g., Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of Clergy from
the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 LoY. L:A. L. REV. 1733 (1996).
159. Id. at 1736.
160. Id. at 1736-37.
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cases, when evaluating free exercise claims.'61 Claimants asserting their
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution had
to (1) prove that the regulated or prohibited practice or conduct was
motivated by or stemmed from sincerely held religious beliefs, and (2)
demonstrate that the state regulation actually burdened those prac-
tices. 62 It was then up to the state to show (3) that a "compelling state
interest" justified the burden on the belief in question, and (4) that the
burden was the "least restrictive means" of achieving that interest.' 63
In Employment Division v. Smith,'64 the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause allowed a state to ban the use of the drug pe-
yote, even if the ban applied to those who used the drug during religious
rituals. 65 The Court conceded that when the government prohibits con-
duct only when the conduct is engaged in for religious purposes, the
Free Exercise Clause is violated.' The Court concluded, however, that
the Clause was not violated when the burden placed on a religious prac-
tice was not the object of the government, but simply an "incidental ef-
fect" of a "generally applicable" law.' 67 Thus, the Free Exercise Clause
means that citizens are not excused from their duty to comply with a
general law that either forbids or mandates conduct that their religion
might happen to command or prohibit.' 6' The Court went on to state
that "the mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from
the discharge of political responsibilities."'6 9 Thus, the Court concluded,
such general laws will not be subject to strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause.7
In the wake of the Smith decision, then, persons claiming that their
free exercise rights have been violated must carry a heavier burden than
they did under the previous line of cases. And as rules requiring "every
man's evidence"'' seem to be religiously neutral and generally applica-
161. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
162. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716-18.
163. Id. at 718.
164. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165. See id. at 890.
166. See id at 877-78.
167. lad at 878.
168. See ide at 879.
169. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990) (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,594-95 (1940)).
170. See id. at 882.
171. See, e.g., Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 275 (1931) (Pound, J., dissenting)
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ble, the right of members of the clergy to assert the priest-penitent
privilege on their own behalf and refuse to testify would appear to be in
some jeopardy. But two lines of argument within the Smith decision it-
self may provide the means around this apparent obstacle.
An exception to the arguably harsh rule in Smith occurs when mem-
bers of the clergy exercise their right as holders of the priest-penitent
privilege, because then the right to the free exercise of one's religion is
not the only right involved. Rather, this free exercise right is coupled
with other constitutional protections such as the right against compelled
expression ' or perhaps even the right of a father-albeit a spiritual
one-to oversee the religious formation of his children.7 3 Such "cou-
pling" of rights for a "hybrid" claim would seem to satisfy Smith, which
rejected the Native Americans' claims in part because their free exer-
cise claims were "unconnected with any communicative activity or pa-
rental right." 74 If members of the clergy are compelled to testify against
their consciences or forced to choose between violating a court order or
the rules of their religious traditions, their free exercise of religion is
obviously hampered. By tying that claim to one or both of the other
constitutional rights mentioned, claimants could allay the concern of the
Smith Court that democratic government would become impossible if
every citizen could refuse to obey laws by simply claiming that the law
conflicted with their religious beliefs. 5
Granted, the right against compelled expression in this context has
not been recognized universally or without qualification.17 6 But if free
exercise claims are only valid when "coupled" with another right, which
standing by itself would merit strict scrutiny anyway, then in effect the
free exercise claim has been rendered inconsequential. "
The second way in which a member of the clergy could claim a free
("The public has a claim to every man's evidence unless the witness is specially exempted
and protected by law.").
172. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (invalidating
compulsory flag salute statute challenged by religious objectors). Being forced to testify
might be, under some circumstances, a violation of a person's free speech rights.
173. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (preventing govern-
ment interference in the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of children under their control.").
174. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (suggesting certain
freedoms are subject to the duty to testify in court).
177. See generally Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Prove-
nance and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 833 (1993).
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exercise right to hold the priest-penitent privilege, even under Smith, is
by reference to the special nature of the government assessment neces-
sary in these circumstances. In Smith, the Court held that it would ap-
ply a different free exercise analysis (referred to as "the Sherbert test")
only when circumstances dictated an "individualized governmental as-
sessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." '78 Like the unem-
ployment compensation cases under the Sherbert line, the circumstances
surrounding a priest-penitent claim invite a particularized government
assessment. A court would have to consider whether a particular cleric
of a particular denomination must reveal the contents of an allegedly
confidential communication from a particular penitent.179
Even if free exercise claimants succeed in negotiating the formida-
ble hurdle posed by Smith, they would still need to answer the objection
posed by some that the priest-penitent privilege violates another provi-
sion of the First Amendment-the Establishment Clause.'O
2. The Establishment Clause Objection
The Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause 8' of the
First Amendment prohibits all governmental bodies from either favor-
ing a particular religion' or even aiding religion in general."8 But this
is not to say that government may not "accommodate religious prac-
tices. '"'4  In spite of the Court's favorable references to the priest-
178. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
179. See, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining
the particular nature of the Sacrament of Penance in the Catholic Church); Magar v. State,
826 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1992) (refusing to recognize a privilege because a cleric testified that
confession was not a tenet or practice of his particular denomination).
180. See, e.g., Robert L. Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-
Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITr. L. REV. 27, 59-62
(1967); Homer, supra note 27, at 721-28; Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-
Communicant Privilege Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L. J. 397, 423
(1987).
181. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
182. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,244-46 (1982) (holding the Establishment
Clause's "clearest command" is "that one religious denomination cannot be officially pre-
ferred over another"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that the Es-
tablishment Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
183. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,216 (1963) (claiming the Court had
"rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only govern-
mental preference of one religion over another"); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (ruling that neither
state nor federal government may pass laws aiding one religion or all religions).
184. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994) (providing that the gov-
ernment "may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices ... without violating
[Vol. 82:171
1998] THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
penitent privilege,'5 some have asked whether the privilege is unconsti-
tutional in light of the Establishment Clause."6
What test the Court uses when applying the Establishment Clause is
no longer clear. The famous Lemon'87 test has come under fire from
several of the justices,uss and at least two other tests, or "refinements" of
Lemon, have been proposed.189 Thus, this Comment will examine the
priest-penitent privilege in light of each of these three tests.
Under Lemon, a statute will run afoul of the Establishment Clause if
it fails to pass any one of the test's three prongs. First, it must have a
"secular legislative purpose;" second, its principal effect must be one
that "neither advances nor inhibits religion;" third, it must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."'' "
While some have assumed that the religious nature of the priest-
penitent privilege violates the first prong of the Lemon test,'9' a reason-
able argument can be made that it does not. The Advisory Committee
the Establishment Clause" (citations omitted)). The Court also stated that states can provide
"benevolent neutrality" to religious practices "without sponsorship and without interfer-
ence." Id. at 705.
185. See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). See supra notes 51-60
and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2, at 109 (John William Strong et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1992) (declaring that it is an "open question" whether the clergy privilege is con-
stitutional); Stoyles, supra note 180 (concluding that the privilege is, in fact, unconstitu-
tional); Horner, supra note 27, at 728 (arguing that the privilege "technically" violates the
Establishment Clause).
187. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971).
188. At least four of the current justices have expressed some discomfort with the
Lemon test. Justice Scalia has agreed with the "long list of constitutional scholars who have
criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines
and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy has
suggested the Lemon test should not be the "primary guide" in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). Chief Justice Rehnquist has claimed the Lemon test has "no more grounding in the
history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests." Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's position on
the Lemon test is unclear since issuing a "clarification" of it in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and further discussing it in her concurrence in
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 717-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189. Justice O'Connor explains the "endorsement" test in her concurrences in Lynch,
465 U.S. at 688-94, and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 627-32. Justice Kennedy's
dissent in the latter case contains his suggested "coercion" test, id at 655-67, and his majority
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), explains it in more detail.
190. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
191. See, e.g., Homer, supra note 27, at 723 (arriving at the "inescapable conclusion"
that the privilege lacks a secular legislative purpose).
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that drafted Federal Rule of Evidence 506, for example, pointed out
that the priest-penitent privilege could avoid Establishment Clause
problems if it were based on the "same considerations which underlie
the psychotherapist-patient privilege."' 92  A secular purpose for the
priest-penitent privilege might be the promotion of spiritual confessions
primarily because of their value to the mental health of individuals
within a community.'93 A provision guaranteeing the clergy status as
holders guarantees two things in furtherance of this secular purpose:
(1) potential penitents will know that their clergy also have the right to
remain silent about these communications, and (2) clergy will make
themselves available for these beneficial conferences knowing they will
not be forced to testify about them.
Some scholars have maintained that the priest-penitent privilege
fails the second prong of the Lemon test because its "primary effect" is
the advancement of religion in general, if not those particular religions
that require confession.94 The Court has let stand, however, laws that
benefit religious groups when that benefit is shared with other similarly
situated groups.'95 On this basis, one might argue that current privileges
for other professions that promote mental health'96 negate any argument
of special support of religion in particular. ' Extending the right to hold
the privilege to clergy of all denominations, rather than just those that
require confidentiality,'98 would seem to satisfy this prong.'99 In any
192. Advisory Committee's Note, Rejected Rule 506(b), quoted in WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 68 n.283.
193. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 782; see also K. Lianne Wallace, Note, Privileged
Communications In Sexual Assault Cases: Rhode Island's Treatment of Clergyman-
Parishioner and Psychotherapist-Patient Communications, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 433, 464
(1994).
194. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 71.
195. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997).
196. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-32 (1996).
197. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 784; see also Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954
(Utah 1994) (referring to the psychotherapist-patient privilege as the "secular analogue" to
the priest-penitent privilege). But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 71 (ar-
guing that the priest-penitent privilege is unique in that it is absolute, whereas the other
privileges are not).
198. Several legal commentators have repeated the erroneous statement that Catholic
priests may divulge the contents of a sacramental confession upon the consent of the peni-
tent. This is simply untrue, as Canon Law clearly indicates the sacramental seal is inviolable.
See 1983 CODE c.983, §§ 3,4; see also THE CANON LAW SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
IRELAND, THE CANON LAW: LETTER & SPIRIT 535 (1995) ("The use of the Latin word ne-
fas ('absolutely wrong') shows how seriously the norm of this canon is regarded. Put simply,
the priest is strictly forbidden to reveal by any means whatever anything the penitent may
have disclosed to him. Even the penitent cannot release him from this obligation.").
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case, courts have acknowledged that many religions today recognize the
confidential nature of communications made between their adherents
and members of their clergy.'
Another possible justification of the privilege that would satisfy this
second prong of Lemon may be seen by drawing an analogy to exemp-
tions from military service. °' The Establishment Clause objection-
that recognizing clergy as holders of the privilege has the primary effect
of advancing religion--can be answered as follows: The Court has con-
strued the exemption from military service broadly enough so that even
non-theistic objections will suffice, so long as they are spiritually based,
conscientious, and spring from something more than mere pragmatism.
When dealing with the priest-penitent exemption, the Court could con-
strue it broadly enough to allow any similarly motivated objection of a
cleric to testify.m
The third prong of the Lemon test is, arguably, the easiest for the
privilege to satisfy. While some "entanglement" between government
and religion would obviously be involved when adjudicating privilege
The error seems to have originated in an unreferenced assertion in the first edition of
Tiemann's oft-cited work, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE, supra note 139, at 124. It also appears in
his second edition. See WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN & JOHN C. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO
SILENCE 193 (2d ed. 1983). Significantly, his third edition modifies the offending passage
considerably and removes the erroneous statement. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 16, at
197. Sadly, however, this misstatement of the Catholic position has found its way into the
legal literature, probably because of the strong influence of Tiemann's first two books. See,
e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 206, n.6.
Recently, a high-ranking Catholic leader offered the following statement on this subject:
That which the priest learns in the confessional, he knows uniquely as the represen-
tative of God, and not at all through human knowledge or communication; he
should completely detach himself from (such knowledge); it is as if he knows noth-
ing. It is necessary that the faithful have the most absolute confidence in the per-
fect discretion of confessors. Also the secret is more rigid than any other and never
permits the least exception.
Bevilacqua, supra note 158, at 1735-36 (citation omitted).
199. Under Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982), the "principle of denomina-
tional neutrality" might be violated if the law recognized clerics from only certain specific
religions as holders of the privilege. See also Rev. Martin R. Bartel, OSB, Pennsylvania's
Clergy-Communicant Privilege: For Everything There Is. . . A Time to Keep Silent, 69
TEMPLE L. REv. 817, 822-23 (1996) (arguing that a broad definition of clergy would be more
likely to pass constitutional muster with the courts).
200. See, e.g., State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 826 (N.J. 1994) (discussing confidentiality
policies of several religions).
201. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 71-72.
202. See id. Whether someone can be a member of a "clergy" in a "non-theistic" relig-
ion, however, would be an open question.
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claims, it is unlikely it would become "excessive," especially in light of
the thorny problems that are almost certain to arise in the absence of
the privilege and the right of a member of the clergy to assert it.2
Other Supreme Court decisions have held that the Establishment
Clause does not mandate the absence of all contact between govern-
ment and religion.2 4 And in light of judicially approved military or leg-
islative chaplaincies, where clerics are supervised and paid by the gov-
ernment, it seems likely that a testimonial privilege involving
significantly less entanglement would be permitted' 5
Under one of two possible alternatives to Lemon the Court has
used, the "endorsement" test proposed by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v.
Donnelly, government action is unconstitutional if its "actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion" or "in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. '"2 In Lynch, the Court held that a
Christmas creche in a city park did neither, given that other holiday dis-
plays were placed alongside the Christmas creche and that such displays
had been used for so long that members of the public would not find the
practice to be an endorsement of religion.m The priest-penitent privi-
lege seems to satisfy both of these concerns. The privilege appears in
evidence codes alongside other privileges, and, more importantly, has
been in use for so long and with so few objections that its uniquely re-
ligious significance has diminished, or at least that the evils the Estab-
lishment Clause seeks to prevent are in no danger of arising.?
Under a second alternative to Lemon, the "coercion" test employed
203. It is conceivable that many courts would face the unenviable task of routinely ei-
ther forcing religious figures to testify or holding them in contempt of court. But see
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 75 (arguing that "the precedents do not sup-
port a clear-cut decision either way, whether the question is this last [third] element or the
Lemon test in its entirety.").
204. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (allowing property tax
exemptions for religious organizations, in part because of the excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion that would arise in their absence).
205. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 784-85; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
792 (1983) (recognizing constitutionality of a state legislative chaplain).
206. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
207. IdL at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. See id. at 692-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Some constitutional law scholars rea-
son that long-accepted practices which would be otherwise suspect are sometimes permitted
because history has shown "no significant danger of eroding governmental neutrality re-
garding religious matters." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1166 (4th ed. 1991). Another scholar attributes this permissive attitude to a gradual
loss of the uniquely religious significance of the practice. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1224 (2d ed. 1988).
209. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 76.
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by the Court in Lee v. Weisman,210 the priest-penitent privilege and the
right of members of the clergy to assert it on their own behalf seem to
be safe. The coercion test guarantees that "government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise
act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.' 2 1 While the Court held that a school-sponsored prayer
violated this test,2 a recognition of the privilege and its holder, far from
coercing religious faith, merely accommodates it.
Even if one concludes that recognizing a member of the clergy as
holder of the priest-penitent privilege runs counter to the spirit of the
Establishment Clause, many scholars have argued that free exercise ac-
commodations serve as a "carve out" exception to the Establishment
Clause, or at the very least as a middle ground that is neither mandated
by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
211Clause.21
B. Clergy's Right to the Privilege Under State Constitutions
Even if the right of a member of the clergy is not recognized under
the federal constitution, and as long as it is not seen as violating the Es-
tablishment Clause, claimants might also find relief under state consti-
tutions, which are free to construe any Free Exercise Clauses contained
therein more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court construed the First
Amendment in Smith.
214
When evaluating free exercise claims under their state constitutions,
some state courts215 still employ the four-pronged test the United States
Supreme Court used before Employment Division v. Smith.216 Under
this test, claimants had to (1) prove that the regulated or prohibited
practice or conduct was motivated by or stemmed from sincerely held
religious beliefs, and (2) demonstrate that the state regulation actually
210. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
211. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
212. See id at 599.
213. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 66; Douglas Laycock, Free
Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 900 (1994).
214. See, e.g., State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1074 (Wash. 1990) (acknowledging
that state constitutional provisions may be applied "more strictly than parallel federal provi-
sions"); see also supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Wis. 1996) ("[O]ur analysis of the
freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is not constrained by the
boundaries of protection the United States Supreme Court has set for the federal provi-
sion.").
216. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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burdened those practices."' It was then up to the state to show (3) that
a "compelling state interest" justified the burden on the belief in ques-
tion, and (4) that the burden was the "least restrictive means" of
achieving that interest. 18
Most members of the clergy would have little problem asserting the
first prong; namely, that their belief that the sanctity of the revealed
communication is threatened by a compelled revelation is both sincere
and religiously motivated.2"9 Similarly, most religious organizations
could, without a great deal of difficulty, make a showing that their prac-
tice of confidential communications would be severely affected if it be-
came known that members of the clergy could be forced to reveal the
contents of those communications." On the other hand, clerics them-
selves might argue that their ability to offer such spiritual counseling
would be adversely affected if the state could require such testimony
under threat of civil or penal sanction.2'
Does the state have a compelling interest that overrides the First
Amendment rights of a member of the clergy? It is difficult to say with
certainty. Courts have long recognized that the state has a "right to
everyman's evidence,"'m and some commentators point to a string of
cases that arguably mark out some of the limits of the priest-penitent
privilege.22m Nevertheless, each of these cases can be distinguished on its
facts.24 Furthermore, testimony sought from a member of the clergy
does not necessarily contain any inherent guarantees of reliability. In
fact, if a particular penitent knows a particular priest could be com-
pelled to testify about the contents of his confession, it could be inher-
217. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,716-18 (1981).
218. Id. at 718-19.
219. This claim, though easier to assert in a denomination with an established canon
law, would certainly not be impossible for someone of a different religious persuasion. See
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 61-62; see also Mitchell, supra note 15, at 799-
806.
220. But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 63 (claiming "it is doubtful
if Roman Catholicism would be significantly burdened by the occasional disclosure of a peni-
tential communication.").
221. This is essentially what Fr. Mockaitis claimed. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104
F.3d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1997).
222. See, e.g., Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 275 (1931) (Pound, J., dissenting)
("The public has a claim to every man's evidence unless the witness is specially exempted
and protected by law.").
223. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 64-65.
224. In most of them, the member of the clergy demanding the privilege appeared to be
involved in the wrongdoing under investigation. See id.
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ently unreliable.25
The state's interest in gathering evidence for the administration of
justice is obvious. Less obvious, however, is the right of the state to
peek behind the veil of secrecy protecting communications between
members of the clergy and the people they serve. The state can hardly
demand evidence that, but for the existence of the confidential priest-
penitent relationship, it never would have been able to acquire other-
wise.
A government body would also seem to have a difficult time arguing
that compelling testimony from a member of the clergy was the "least
restrictive means" by which to gather evidence, especially given the
presence of other testimonial privileges that are likely to involve more
substantial communications.22 6 Furthermore, courts have tended to
place a heavy burden on a government body asserting its need for tes-
timony when First Amendment freedoms are involved.m
Thus, under the four-pronged analysis following the Sherbert-Yoder-
Thomas line of cases and used in many states, members of the clergy
should be able to assert their free exercise fights to act as holders of the
priest-penitent privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that members of the clergy should be
recognized as holders of the priest-penitent privilege. Members of the
clergy should not be forced to choose between following the law of their
church and the law of their state. Those engaged in ministry should not
have to curtail their sacred-and constitutionally protected-work in
the face of threats from courts or administrative agencies. And mem-
bers of the faithful should not have to fear that the confidential com-
munications they entrust to their clergy can be forced into the open.
The contrary argument is, no doubt, often motivated by a desire to
garner as much evidence as possible in order to help solve heinous
crimes like the ones in Mockaitis v. Harcleroad. Nevertheless, the sanc-
tity of the confessional or other place of religious counsel is worthy of
225. As to the questionable sincerity of a criminal defendant, see the discussion of de-
fendant Hale in the Mockaitis case, supra note 11. See also State v. Szemple, 622 A.2d 248,
254 n.5 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), affd, 640 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1994) (noting that "[d]ue
to the belief in the usual truthfulness of facts told during the confession, the testimony of a
clergyman concerning the confession might be given too much weight in reaching a find-
ing.").
226. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5612, at 65 n.272.
227. See Sippel, supra note 27, at 1154 n.194.
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constitutional protection. This is true not only because spiritual com-
munications have therapeutic value, or even because wise counsel of-
fered by caring ministers often can lead to criminals turning themselves
in, but because the opportunity for confidential and cathartic confession
may represent one of the last strongholds of privacy against the ever en-
croaching police power of the state. It may also serve as a fitting re-
minder to all ministers of justice in our society that they did not author
justice, and will one day be responsible for the way in which they have
administered it themselves.
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